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1  Introduction
In 1996 the Witwatersrand Local Division of the High Court upheld an 
exception to a so-called wrongful life claim in the decision of Friedman v 
Glicksman1 (“Friedman”). In doing so, the court denied the disabled plaintiff 
child the opportunity to claim for damages based on the fact that, had it not 
been for the negligence of the defendant medical practitioners who failed to 
properly advise his parents, he would not have been born.2 Eleven years later 
the Cape High Court once again denied the existence of the claim,3 albeit 
for different reasons than those used by the Court in Friedman. Against this 
background the Supreme Court of Appeal had the opportunity to provide its 
well-reasoned answers to the many questions resulting from the two conflicting 
decisions and to finally put to rest the matter of whether the action should be 
recognised in South African law or not. The manner in which the Supreme 
Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal4 calls for another review of the policy 
arguments underlying this action. This article aims to do so by discussing the 
fairly recent case law, both in South Africa and in other jurisdictions, and to 
identify and evaluate the problematic aspects which impede the recognition 
of the action against the backdrop of a new era in which not only children, but 
also their rights must be protected. Regardless of the fact of whether the foreign 
jurisdictions accept or reject this claim, the courts seem willing to engage 
with changing value systems, having due regard to developments in medical 
science and the impact thereof on pre-natal care. The argument advanced in 
this article is that, given the constitutional dispensation and the promulgation 
of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005,5 and in particular the entrenchment of the 
best interest of the child, the opportunity now exists to reconcile the principles 
1 1996 1 SA 1134 (W)  
2 The court did, however, allow the parents of the child to claim special damages resulting from the same 
set of facts in their so-called wrongful birth claim  See especially 1139-1140 of the decision
3 In Stewart v Botha 2007 6 SA 247 (C); 2007 9 BCLR 1012; 2007 3 All SA 440
4 Stewart v Botha 2008 6 SA 310 (SCA) and also referred to as Stewart v Botha (340/2007) [2008] ZASCA 
84 (3 June 2008))
5 Although only some of the provisions of this Act came into operation on 1 July 2007, all of the sections 
which are mentioned in this article are fully operational
       
of delict with the constitutionally enshrined rights of children. The underlying 
aim is therefore to raise awareness of the protection of children’s rights in the 
context of the claim for wrongful life.
2  Stewart v Botha
2 1  The facts
The plaintiffs in this matter were the parents of a child born with severe 
physical disabilities. Their son was born in 1993 with congenital defects 
which included a defect of the lower spine which affects the nerve supply 
to his bowel, bladder and lower limbs, as well as a defect of the brain.6 The 
mother, in her personal capacity, claimed special damages in respect of past 
and future medical expenses resulting from their son’s condition, the costs of 
his special schooling, and maintenance for the remainder of his life from the 
general medical practitioner and the specialist obstetrician and gynaecologist 
who treated her during her pregnancy.7 The son’s father, in the alternative, in 
his representative capacity, claimed the same damages on behalf of their child 
but did not claim any compensation for loss of future income or for general 
damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life.8 Both these 
actions were brought as it was averred that the defendants did not advise the 
mother of the high risk of the child being born with severe disabilities and had 
the plaintiffs been so informed, they would have terminated the pregnancy. 
The defendants took exception to the so-called wrongful life claim, brought 
on behalf of the child, contending, inter alia, that no such cause of action 
exists in South African law since the defendants did not owe the foetus or, 
for that matter, the child after his birth, any duty to inform his parents of the 
possibility of disabilities. They furthermore averred that the damages claimed 
were not claims which the child may bring as he had suffered no determinable 
loss himself. The second defendant also argued that the claim was “bad in law, 
contra bonos mores and against public policy”.9
2 2  The High Court decision10
While examining the judgment of Goldblatt J in Friedman v Glicksman,11 
the only other South African ruling pertaining to the recognition of the claim, 
the Cape High Court accepted the distinctions which the Witwatersrand Local 
Division made between the different concepts of “wrongful pregnancy”, 
“wrongful birth” and “wrongful life”.12 The Cape High Court evaluated 
the reasoning of Goldblatt J while also considering the decisions of various 
6 Para 1 of the SCA decision
7 no exception was raised against this claim by the mother, the so-called wrongful birth claim – see para 6 
of the Cape High Court decision
8 Para 3 of the Cape High Court decision
9 The exceptions taken by the defendants are summarized in para 11 of the Cape High Court judgment and 
also discussed at para 3 of the SCA judgment
10 Stewart v Botha 2007 6 SA 247 (C)  
11 1996 1 SA 1134 (W)  
12 Stewart v Botha 2007 6 SA 247 (C) para 7
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foreign jurisdictions, including that of the United States of America, England, 
Australia and Canada. The court found that it could not agree with the three 
grounds used by the court in Friedman in rejecting the claim. It firstly found 
that the public policy argument, claiming that it would be contrary to public 
policy to acknowledge that it would be better for a person not to be alive 
than to live with their disabilities,13 has been eroded in South Africa by the 
Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996.14 This Act, inter alia, 
specifically provides for an abortion in circumstances where “there exists a 
substantial risk that the foetus would suffer from a severe physical or mental 
abnormality”,15 therefore implicitly recognising the choice between non-
life and life in an impaired state. Louw J found that the reality of a life with 
disabilities should be recognised and by allowing the claim, it is recognised 
that the child was now in existence in a disabled state in which it would not have 
been had it not been born.16 Similarly the court could not find any reason as 
to why, in the wrongful life claim, the sanctity of life argument would be “an 
insurmountable obstacle to the claim”, but not so in the recognition of the claim 
by the parents in both wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth actions.17 The 
child could therefore not be barred from claiming for damages on the basis of 
the sanctity of life argument. Furthermore, as to the question of wrongfulness, 
the court held that the duty owed to the child was that of properly advising his 
mother and the fact that the only “treatment” presently available to prevent a 
life with disabilities, is that of an abortion, should not be used as the reason for 
denying the claim. In the future, advancements in medical science may render 
the treatment of congenital disorders of the foetus possible and the “negligent 
failure to diagnose or treat such disorders in accordance with procedures then 
available, resulting in the birth of a disabled child, will then clearly result in an 
action for the child.”18 The child should also be allowed a claim for medical 
expenses, special schooling and his maintenance as, in certain circumstances, 
it may be impossible for his parents to claim such costs.19
The second ground on which the claim was denied in Friedman was that 
it could open the door for disabled children to sue their parents because they, 
alive to the risks involved, allowed the child to be born. This, the court in 
casu found to be an unconvincing argument as it held that the parents would 
have been exercising their constitutional right to making decisions regarding 
reproduction. It would depend on the circumstances and views of the 
community set out in the Constitution of whether the child would be able to 
13 Friedman v Glicksman 1996 1 SA 1134 (W) 1142I–J  
14 Stewart v Botha 2007 6 SA 247 (C) paras 18–19
15 Section 2(1)(b)(ii)  
16 Stewart v Botha 2007 6 SA 247 (C) para 18  The court also cited a passage from Curlender v Bio-Science 
Laborotaries 106 Cal App 3d 811:
   “The reality of the wrongful life concept is that such a plaintiff both exists and suffers due to the 
negligence of others ”
17 Stewart v Botha 2007 6 SA 247 (C) paras 20–21
18 Para 22
19 Para 22
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sue his parents and the fact that the child was able to sue the relevant doctor 
would not affect this claim.20
As to the third ground for the rejection of the wrongful life claim in 
Friedman the court held that the objection to the claim did not lie in the 
difficulty in assessing the damages suffered by the child but rather in the 
question of whether the child suffered any damage at all.21 It found that the 
negligent conduct of the defendants were legally irrelevant to the state in 
which the child was born. The child could therefore, given the current state of 
medical science, not hold the medical practitioners liable as “the only life ever 
possible to him was a life in the handicapped state to which he was born.”22 
If his mother had exercised an informed decision not to abort, he would still 
have been in exactly the same state as he was in now. It followed that the 
wrongful life claim did not disclose a cause of action23 and the exception was 
accordingly upheld.24
2 3  The Supreme Court of Appeal judgment25
The Supreme Court of Appeal firstly paid attention to the recent debate on 
the subject of wrongfulness and negligence and emphasised that the inquiry 
as to wrongfulness relies on the existence of a legal duty not to act negligently. 
In determining whether or not conduct could be considered to be wrongful, a 
balance should be struck between the interests of the community, the interests 
of the parties and that which the court considers to be “society’s notions of 
what justice demands”,26 having particular regard to the requirements set by 
the Constitution.27 The court identified the existential question as to whether, 
from the child’s perspective, it had been preferable to “not have been born at 
all”, to be the core issue, and, in order to recognise the claim, one would have 
to evaluate the existence of the child against his or her non-existence and find 
that the latter was preferable.28
The court then proceeded by referring to decisions of foreign jurisdictions, 
both rejecting and acknowledging the claim,29 and concluded that, despite 
the ongoing debate regarding the matter, it was not necessary to evaluate all 
these arguments.30 It also, rather tersely,31 dismissed the appellant’s broad 
submissions regarding the relevance of sections 11, 12(2)(a), 27, 28(1)(d) and 
28(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.32 Snyders 
20 Para 23
21 Paras 24–29
22 Para 30
23 Para 31
24 Para 32
25 Stewart v Botha 2008 6 SA 310 (SCA)
26 Minister of Law & Order v Kadir 1995 1 SA 303 (A) 318E–H as cited by the SCA at para 8 of the 
judgment
27 Stewart v Botha 2008 6 SA 310 (SCA) para 7
28 Para 11
29 Paras 12–14
30 Para 15  It appears that the court considered it sufficient to very briefly refer to some of the arguments and 
counter-arguments which have been raised regarding this controversial issue, see paras 16–21
31 In four short paragraphs, paras 22–25
32 “The Constitution”
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AJA concluded that, regardless of the perspective one has regarding a claim 
of this kind, the “essential question that a court will be called upon to answer 
… is whether the particular child should have been born at all”,33 therefore 
opting for the latter in the impossible, yet unavoidable, choice between life 
with disabilities and non-existence.34 This, the court held, “not only involves 
a disregard for the sanctity of life and the dignity of the child, but involves an 
arbitrary, subjective preference for some policy considerations and the denial 
of others.”35 The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.36
3  The position elsewhere
3 1  Dismissal of the claim in Australia
On 9 May 2006 the High Court of Australia held by a six to one majority 
that the claim based on a wrongful life does not constitute a valid cause of 
action.37 In dismissing the appeals to the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
new South Wales38 and the new South Wales Court of Appeals39 the highest 
Australian court also found that the child plaintiffs in both the Harriton and 
Waller matters could not prove any damages since proof of such damages 
would require an impossible comparison between a life without disabilities 
and non-existence, ie the state in which the children would have been had 
the negligence not occurred.40 The court did, however, in contradistinction 
to the South African Supreme Court of Appeal, provide extensive reasons for 
its decision, considering and evaluating the various arguments regarding the 
subject and explaining their assessment of public policy issues in detail.
3 1 1  The agreed facts
Alexia Harriton was born in 1981 with severe congenital disabilities, 
including blindness, deafness, mental retardation and spasticity. These 
disabilities were caused by the rubella virus with which her mother had been 
infected in the first trimester of her pregnancy. Her mother visited the defendant, 
Dr Paul Stephens, and his father, Dr Max Stephens, who both assured her, 
following some blood tests, that the fever and rash which she suspected might 
be rubella, was not in fact so. Alexia’s claim for damages included special 
damages for past and future medical and care costs and general damages 
for pain and suffering.41 On the day after his birth, Keedan Waller was in 
33 Stewart v Botha 2008 6 SA 310 (SCA) para 28
34 Para 27
35 Para 27 (footnotes omitted)  The court, in the same paragraph, also regarded the recognition of this claim 
by certain jurisdictions to be a simple preference for certain policy considerations above others “without 
striking a balance that takes all the relevant norms and demands of justice into account ” 
36 Para 30
37 Harriton v Stephens 226 CLR 52  See also Waller v James 226 ALR 457; Waller v Hoolahan 226 CLR 
136  
38 Harriton v Stephens (2004) 59 nSWLR 694
39 Harriton v Stephens [2004] nSWCA 93
40 See for example paras 251–257 of the majority judgment per Crennan J (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, 
Heydon and Hayne JJ concurring) of Harriton v Stephens, Waller v James 226 CLR 52 as discussed 
below  
41 See paras 15–20, 158–159, 186–192 and 210–212 of the Harriton decision
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turn diagnosed as suffering from a cerebral thrombosis, having inherited his 
father’s anti-thrombin 3 deficiency condition. In addition to suffering this 
condition, Keeden suffered from permanent brain damage, cerebral palsy and 
uncontrolled seizures. He was the result of IVF treatment which his parents 
received in november 1999 and despite a letter informing the first defendant 
of Mr Waller’s deficiency, the potential for its transmission to his offspring 
was never tested. It was agreed that had Mr and Mrs Waller been properly 
advised by the defendants, being their obstetricians specialising in infertility, 
in vitro fertilization and ante-natal care, they would not have proceeded with 
the treatment or they would have terminated the pregnancy.42
3 1 2  The majority decision43
Writing for the majority of the court, Crennan J identified the main issues to 
be that of the existence of a duty of care, the proof and calculation of damages, 
as well as certain questions of policy such as the value of life and corrective 
justice.44 The judge found that, in determining whether a doctor owes a duty 
of care to a foetus, it was important to bear in mind that it was only the mother 
who was entitled to a decision to terminate her pregnancy lawfully and that 
this decision does not necessarily encompass the foetus’s best interests.45 
Although there can be no doubt that a doctor has a duty to advise a mother of 
problems which may arise during her pregnancy, and that this duty may be 
mediated through the mother to the foetus, it would be incompatible with the 
existing duty towards the mother to superimpose such a duty to a foetus. The 
court held that recognising a “duty of care on a doctor to a foetus (when born) 
to advise the mother so that she can terminate a pregnancy in the interest 
of the foetus not being born, which may or may not be compatible with the 
same doctor’s duty of care to the mother in respect of her interests, has the 
capacity to introduce conflict, even incoherence, into the body of relevant 
legal principle.”46 The acceptance of such a duty may then also open the 
door to parents being sued by their children for their failure to terminate the 
pregnancy.47 Hayne J, however, preferred to “leave aside any consideration of 
what [the lack of proof of damages suffered] might suggest about the duty of 
care.”48
42 See paras 9–16, 52–61 and 70–76 of Waller v James 226 ALR 457
43 Since much which was said in the Harriton ruling also applies to the Waller cases, only the judgment of 
Harriton v Stephens 226 CLR 52 will be discussed in this note
44 Paras 242–278  The court found that despite the fact that no duty of care existed and it was consequently 
unnecessary to determine any of the other matters referred to, consideration should still be given to these 
aspects  See para 243
45 Paras 246–247
46 Para 249  The court also remarked that it would not be possible to establish to which “class of” disabled 
person such a duty would extend (para 261)  
47 Para 250
48 Para 159
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As to the question of damages Crennan J emphasised that to be successful 
in a claim, the plaintiff needs to prove actual damage or loss, a court must be 
able to calculate the damages and that all of the above implies that a plaintiff is 
left “worse off” as a result of the negligent conduct of the defendant.49 To prove 
this in a wrongful life claim would require an impossible comparison between 
a life with disabilities and non-existence.50 Since there is at present no field 
of human learning or discourse which would allow a person experiential pre-
existence or afterlife, the court held that “[t]here is no practical possibility of a 
court … ever apprehending or evaluating or receiving proof of, the actual loss 
or damage as claimed by the appellant.”51 As no damages can be established, 
no duty of care could also be alleged to have been breached.52 The court also 
dismissed the reliance on cases involving discontinuation of medical treatment 
since these cases rely on a comparison between continuing medical treatment 
which prolongs life and discontinuing such treatment which may hasten death. 
A court is therefore capable of undertaking a balancing exercise in respect of 
the two possible actions.53
The court was also concerned about what the recognition of a claim for 
wrongful life might imply as to the value of a disabled person’s life. The court 
was of the opinion that, even though it does not deny that disabled persons 
experience a certain amount of pain, disabilities are only one dimension of 
such a person’s humanity and that it could not be contended that, in casu, 
Alexia Harriton, could not experience pleasure.54 Crennan J also raised 
the question as to how one could allow a disabled person to claim his own 
non-existence as actionable damage when differential treatment of disabled 
people is prohibited by statute and no person guilty of manslaughter or murder 
is entitled to use the claim that the victim would have been “better off” as 
defence.55
The appellants finally submitted that “corrective” or “practical” justice would 
permit the appellant to recover damages despite the inherent difficulties her 
claim posed.56 The court acknowledged that Alexia Harriton’s circumstances 
were indeed tragic, but held that the “need for ‘corrective justice’ alone could 
never be determinative of a novel claim in negligence” and to recognise such a 
claim would extend the boundaries of liability when “the liability is precluded 
by ‘an array of other factors’.”57
49 Para 251
50 Para 252
51 Para 253  All of the other judges, with the exception of Kirby J, seemed to agree with this reasoning as the 
primary rationale for the denial of the claim
52 Para 255  Hayne J, however, did not reach such a conclusion
53 Para 256
54 Paras 259–260
55 Paras 262–263
56 Para 271
57 Para 275 (footnotes omitted)  The court in any event doubted as to the need for “corrective justice” in a 
matter where a person was affected by rubella, for which no-one was responsible
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3 1 3  The dissenting judgment
Kirby J, in delivering his reasons for dissent from the majority ruling, 
expressed his concern with regard to the fact that the action is described as 
a claim for wrongful life and suggested that the phrase should be avoided. 
Despite advancing some very compelling reasons58 for refraining from use of 
this “unfortunate”, “misleading and decidedly unhelpful” label, the judge was 
still compelled to use the term as it was used throughout legal literature and 
by the other members of the court.59
According to the dissenting judge the issues for determination were also that 
of establishing whether a duty of care existed, the quantification of damages 
and issues of public policy.60 As to the issue of a duty of care, the judge 
confirmed that duties could not be owed to a foetus since legal personality 
only arises at birth, but that it is also accepted that health care practitioners 
“owe a duty to an unborn child to take reasonable care to avoid conduct 
which might foreseeably cause pre-natal injury.”61 In the present case, the 
respondent accordingly owed the appellant a duty to take reasonable care to 
prevent pre-natal injuries.62 The appellant could therefore expect a standard 
of care from the medical practitioners advising her mother and should one 
deny this unremarkable duty of care, the result would be an exceptional and 
unacceptable immunity to health care providers.63
Kirby J argued, as to the aspect of damages, that the “impossible comparison” 
argument “falls away entirely in so far as special damages are concerned.”64 
58 Paras 9–13  These included the fact that the term was originally used in a different context to refer to 
claims brought by “healthy but ‘illegitimate’ children” (para 9) against their fathers; the fact that the 
plaintiff does not maintain that his existence is wrongful but rather that negligent conduct caused the 
present suffering and that use of the term may obscure and distort the differences between such actions 
and the so-called wrongful birth claims  The judge also found the phrase to “implicitly denigrate the 
value of human existence” as it “discourages dispassionate legal analysis” (para 13)  It was important to 
adjudicate the availability of such claims “by reference to accepted methods of judicial reasoning rather 
than by invoking emotive slogans and the contestable religious or moral postulates that they provoke” 
(para 13)
59 Para 14
60 Para 41  Kirby J had no real difficulty in finding causation as it was clear that, were it not for the 
respondent’s negligence, the appellant would not have been born and would not have experienced the 
suffering, expenses and losses she now does  He referred to the reasoning of Mason P in the Court of 
Appeal (Harriton v Stephens (2004) 59 nSWLR 694) as confirmation of his argument:
   “Doctors seldom cause their patients’ illnesses  But they may be liable in negligence for the pain and 
cost of treating an illness that would have been prevented or cured by reasonable medical intervention ” 
(714)
 As the suffering could have been prevented by the termination of the pregnancy and the respondent 
deprived the appellant’s parents of the opportunity to act on that preventative measure, the respondent 
caused the appellant’s damage, see para 41 of Kirby J’s judgment
61 Para 66
62 Para 66
63 Para 72  The judge also did not agree with the arguments that an impediment to the recognition of this 
duty would be that it would conflict with the duty owed to the respondent’s mother as the mere potential 
for conflict could never prevent a duty of care from arising  He also asked the question as to why the duty 
of care towards the mother should be given preference over that of the mother in every case  See paras 
73–76
64 Para 87
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The judge found support for his reasoning from Professor John Flemming65 
who argues that a comparison between non-existence and life “in a flawed 
condition” is not required with regard to “added (medical) expenses”, which 
in any event is recognised in claims by the parents, or the so-called wrongful 
birth claims.66 This is so since the disabled child would not have had any 
economic needs had the defendant taken reasonable care. The assessment of 
the appellant’s damages consequently presents no peculiar problem.67 The 
judge also recognised that, pertaining to the calculation of general damages, 
instances where the courts have declared lawful the withdrawal of life-
sustaining medical treatment are distinguishable from the cases at hand as 
the latter are not concerned with assigning a monetary value to the difference 
between existence and non-existence. It is, however, important to realise that 
the above-mentioned conundrums also entail “a judicial comparison between 
existence and non-existence.”68
More importantly though, the judge emphasised the fact that the “appellant 
has unarguably suffered, and continues to suffer, significant pain and 
discomfort which she would not have had to endure had the respondent acted 
with reasonable care.”69 Principles of justice and fairness must prevail over 
practical problems in quantifying the damages to an exact amount and the 
courts have in the past indeed adopted a more flexible approach, even where a 
“supposedly impossible comparison was initially invoked to justify acceptance 
of a wrong without a remedy.”70 Kirby J also acknowledged that “it is arguable 
that a life of severe and unremitting suffering is worse than non-existence.”71 
He subsequently found that, in casu, general damages for proved pain and 
suffering and special damages for the additional medical and treatment costs 
should be recoverable by the child.72 The judge furthermore rejected several 
policy arguments since, in most cases they rely on “a misunderstanding of the 
tort of negligence” or “a distorted characterisation of wrongful life claims”.73
65 The Law of Torts 9 ed (1998) 184–185
66 Para 87  Prof  Flemming goes on to state that “symbolic awards are regularly made for pain and suffering, 
even for loss of expectation of life ” The Law of Torts 184-185
67 Para 87
68 Para 95
69 Para 96
70 Kirby J referred to cases in the United Kingdom where pregnant women, dismissed from their employment 
due to their pregnancy, were entitled to relief under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA)  In some of 
these cases, the courts refused to follow a strict comparison since “holding that the dismissal of a pregnant 
woman was not contrary to the SDA because of the impossibility of making a comparison ‘would be so 
lacking in fairness and in what I regard as the proper balance to be struck … that we should only [accede 
to the argument] if we are compelled by the wording of the [SDA] to do so ” (Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) 
Ltd [1992] All ER 43 52)
71 Para 105
72 Para 109
73 Paras 110–116  These statements were made in relation to arguments that wrongful life actions impose a 
duty to kill or that such actions would oblige doctors to urge women to have abortions even if there were 
just the slightest chance that the child would be born defective
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3 2  Recognition of the claim in European jurisdictions
3 2 1  France: The Nicholas Perruche case
On 17 november 2000 the French Cour de Cassation recognised the validity 
of nicholas Perruche’s wrongful life claim.74 The court acknowledged the 
boy’s claim by recognising the causal link between the doctor’s negligence, 
by withholding information regarding the possible impairment of the foetus, 
and the disability of the child.75 It found that the deprivation of the option to 
consider an abortion was the cause of the birth of the disabled child, albeit 
indirectly,76 and nicholas was awarded damages to cover his maintenance 
costs for the rest of his life.77
3 2 2  The Netherlands: The Kelly Molenaar case
The Dutch Ministries of Health and Justice were to a similar extent urged to 
respond to the decision of the highest court of the netherlands in the matter of 
Leids Universitair Medisch Centrum v Molenaar.78 In this controversial ruling, 
the Hoge Raad not only awarded damages to the parents of a handicapped 
child, but also ruled that the child herself was entitled to compensation due to 
the fact that she was born with severe physical and mental disabilities.79 With 
regard to the calculation of damages, it was argued that in terms of section 6:95 
74 The court’s decision is available at http://www vie-publique fr/documents-vp/courcass_9913701 pdf 
(accessed 31-03-2008)  nicholas was born in January 1983 with severe disabilities as it later emerged that 
he could not hear or speak, was virtually blind and could not walk  These disabilities were the result of his 
mother’s exposure to rubella in the fourth week of gestation when nicholas’s four year old sister contracted 
the disease  His mother consulted her physician and two sets of tests were carried out  Despite the fact 
that the results from these tests were contradictory, the physician did not regard it necessary to pursue the 
matter any further  nicholas’s mother was apparently told, inter alia, that she was immune to the disease  
For a detailed account of the facts see also para 31 of the Kelly Molenaar judgment (LJn: AR5213, Hoge 
Raad, C03/206HR), available at www rechtspraak nl (accessed 20-03-2008); Mukheibir “Wrongful Life 
Claims in the netherlands – the Hoge Raad Decides” 2005 Obiter 753 757; Priaulx “Conceptualising Harm 
in the Case of the ‘Unwanted’ Child” 2002 EJHL 337 339; Harrant “Compensation and Wrongful Life: 
A Positive Economic Perspective” 2006 JLE http://findarticles com/p/articles/mi_qa5408/is_200604/
ai_n21392068/print (accessed 28-03-2008) and Lysaught “Wrongful Life? The Strange Case of nicholas 
Perruche” HighBeam Encyclopedia http://www encyclopedia com/printable aspx?id=1G1:84817539 
(accessed 28-03-2008)
75 Harrant 2006 JLE.
76 Priaulx 2002 EJHL 340
77 Mukheibir 2005 Obiter 757  The decision drew severe criticism and protests by gynaecologists and 
obstetricians as well as disabled people  The physicians refused to perform pre-natal ultrasounds on the 
grounds of potential lawsuits and increased malpractice insurance rates while persons with disabilities 
regarded the decision as demeaning and devaluing their lives  In response the French Government adopted 
legislation which now prohibits wrongful life claims  See also Priaulx 2002 EJHL 340
78 LJn: AR5213, Hoge Raad, C03/206HR, available at www rechtspraak nl (accessed 20-03-2008)
79 For the facts of this case see paras 1–2 of the Conclusie of the judgment (LJn: AR5213, Hoge Raad, 
C03/206HR), available at www rechtspraak nl, and also Mukheibir 2005 Obiter 756  Regarding the claim 
brought on behalf of Kelly, the court admitted that in terms of s 1:2 of the Dutch Civil Code an unborn 
may not be a party to an agreement  It should, however, be taken into account that the contract between 
the mother and the medical practitioner, in casu the midwife, was always concluded in the interests of the 
(unborn) child  Those interests included not having to experience a life with disabilities  This does not 
mean that the unborn child has the right to an abortion – this right to choose remains the decision of the 
mother – but due to the fact that the midwife violated the mother’s right to make an informed decision, the 
court found that he also violated the interests of the child (para 46 of the Conclusie)  See also Hendriks 
“Wrongful suits? Suing in the name of Terri Schiavo and Kelly Molenaar” 2005 EJHL 97:
   “[T]he duty to provide good care also seeks to protect the interests of persons who are not a party to a 
medical treatment contract, such as Kelly ” (100)
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of the Dutch Civil Code it was impossible to determine the actual damages 
as such a process would require the comparison between the current state of 
existence and that of the non-existence of Kelly. The court responded by noting 
that with regard to the calculation of patrimonial loss, a comparison would in 
principle be the best option. In so far as the award of non-patrimonial damages 
is concerned, however, the aim is not to achieve restoration of the previous 
position but rather to alleviate the effects of the harm or the reparation of a 
“geschokt rechtsgevoel.”80 The Hoge Raad held that section 6:97 of the Code 
should be used whereby it is also possible to calculate damages in accordance 
with the method which is most appropriate to the nature of the damage.81 The 
court agreed with the lower courts and awarded Kelly compensation for the 
pain and suffering which she experienced.
4  Identifying the issues
From the discussion of the various decisions it becomes clear that the courts 
have been unable to give recognition to the action since it found that one or 
more elements required for establishing liability to be absent from these types 
of claims. In South Africa, a delictual claim, based on the actio legis Aquiliae, 
will only be successful if the plaintiff proves that the defendant due to his 
own fault committed a wrongful act or omission which caused the plaintiff 
to suffer damage.82 The elements of the delict are thus an act or an omission, 
fault, wrongfulness, causation and damage.83 Courts confronted with a 
wrongful life action appear to have no problem in recognising the presence 
of an act or omission or even fault, in the form of negligence, but have found 
that the lack of causation, the existence of damage, the assessment of damages 
and the wrongfulness of the conduct to be obstacles to the recognition of the 
claim. As a result, the interpretation which the courts have given to each of 
these elements deserves to be further discussed and evaluated.
4 1  Causation
As was explained above, Louw J of the Cape High Court found at para 
30 of his judgment in Stewart v Botha84 that the “negligent conduct of the 
defendants [was] irrelevant to the state in which [the child] was born” since 
the “only life ever possible to him was a life in the handicapped state to which 
he was born.” He found that the “hypothetical state in which [the child] would 
have been in had there been no delict, … or if, for instance, [the] mother had 
exercised an informed decision not to abort,” would have been the same as 
which he was in now after his birth.85 The judge, however, viewed this matter 
to be a question of damage and phrased it to be a fundamental question as 
80 Para 53 of the Conclusie
81 Paras 52–53 of the Conclusie  See also Mukheibir 2005 Obiter 756
82 See also Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict 3 ed (2005) 1 for a discussion of the general nature 
and principles of the South African law of delict
83 neethling, Visser & Potgieter Deliktereg 5 ed (2006) 4
84 Stewart v Botha 2007 6 SA 247 (C)
85 Para 30
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to whether any damage had indeed been suffered.86 There are, however, a 
number of flaws in this type of reasoning.
In order to prove factual causation the South African courts have adopted 
the conditio sine qua non test in which the “inquiry simply is: Would the result 
have set in but for the negligent act or omission of the person concerned?”87 
It must be remembered that the true basis for this claim is the negligent 
conduct of the medical practitioner, who failed to inform the parents of the 
possibility of a disabled child. The parents were never given the opportunity 
to make an informed decision to abort. The result is a child living with 
disabilities. It must be emphasised that the allegation is not that the negligence 
of the medical practitioners caused the disabilities, but rather the life with 
disabilities. The Cape High Court seemed to have been under the impression 
that there would have been a third option in this case, that of the child being 
born with disabilities were it not for the delict. However, this is not the case 
since the plaintiff in a wrongful life claim maintains that the parents would 
have terminated the pregnancy had they been informed of the true state of 
affairs. Consequently the answer to the inquiry simply is: a child was born, 
suffering from disabilities, due to the negligence of the defendant medical 
practitioner. The conduct of the physician was a sine qua non of the birth of 
the child and subsequently the element of factual causation can undeniably be 
established.88
4 2  Damage and the assessment of damages
Judging by the number of times the action has been dismissed because courts 
found it impossible to calculate damages suffered in these circumstances,89 
86 Para 29
87 See Minister van Polisie v Skosana 1977 1 SA (A) 44 as cited by Blackbeard “Die Aksie vir ‘Wrongful 
Life’: ‘To be or not to be’?” 1991 THRHR 57 71
88 It is also interesting to note that the court in Friedman v Glicksman 1996 1 SA 1134 (W) had no difficulty 
in dismissing the exception, against the “wrongful birth” claim, that the child’s condition “was not 
caused by any act or omission on the defendant’s part but was a congenital defect arising at the time 
of conception ” The court held that the submission misconstrued the nature of the wrongful life claim 
and that the defendant was responsible and caused the child, with her disabilities, to be born (1139)  The 
exception was apparently not raised against the wrongful life claim  The question as to legal causation 
has never been raised with regard to the claim for wrongful life  It is submitted that in establishing legal 
causation in the context of the wrongful life claim, there is a close enough relationship between the 
negligent omission of the practitioner and the harm resulting in the form of a life with disabilities  See in 
general neethling et al Deliktereg 178–18; Tuck v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1988 3 SA 819 (A) 
833 and Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 3 SA 305 (SCA) 332  For an opposing view, 
however, see Mukheibir “Wrongful Life – the SCA Rules in Stewart v Botha (340/2007) [2008] ZASCA 
84 (3 June 2008)” 2008 Obiter 515 522-523
89 Therefore, for example, the objection by the English Court of Appeal in McKay and Another v Essex Area 
Health Authority and Another [1982] 2 All ER 771 has been used by various other jurisdictions as basis 
for their denial of the claim  Griffiths LJ stated that:
   “To my mind, the most compelling reason to reject this cause of action is the intolerable and insoluble 
problem it would create in the assessment of damages  The basis of damages for personal injury is 
the comparison between the state of the plaintiff before he was injured and his condition after he was 
injured  This is often hard enough in all conscience and it has an element of artificiality about it, for 
who can say that there is any sensible correlation between pain and money? nevertheless, the courts 
have been able to produce a broad tariff that appears at the moment to be acceptable to society as doing 
rough justice  But the whole exercise, difficult as it is, is anchored in the first place to the condition of 
the plaintiff before the injury which the court can comprehend and evaluate  In a claim for wrongful 
life how does the court begin to make an assessment?” (790)
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while in some other instances courts have had no difficulty in assessing the 
damages,90 it is evident that the debate surrounding the proof of damage and 
the calculation of damages requires a critical and comprehensive evaluation.
Damage or harm in terms of the law of delict has been described as the 
suffering of patrimonial or pecuniary loss (damnum), or an injury to an 
interest of personality (iniuria) or the experience of pain and suffering.91 It 
can therefore also be said to be the injurious effect upon any patrimonial or 
pecuniary interest which the law regards to be worthy of protection.92 In the 
case of an action for wrongful life, as is the case with an action for wrongful 
birth, the plaintiff seeks to recover patrimonial loss in the form of the real 
expenses which she has incurred with regard to medical expenses, special 
schooling and maintenance, as well as compensation for the injury to her 
personality interest and pain and suffering she has to endure caused by a life 
with disabilities.
As was discussed at 4 1 above, the Cape High Court found that, with the 
facts before it, no damage had been suffered at all since the “only life ever 
possible to [the child] was a life in the handicapped state to which he was 
born.”93 It must, however, be borne in mind that, had the expert medical 
practitioner not been negligent, the child would not have been born. The child 
or her parents are now, due to this negligent omission, suffering a loss of a 
pecuniary interest and experiencing a life of pain and suffering due to her 
life with disabilities. In the words of Goldblatt J in Friedman, albeit delivered 
with regard to the wrongful birth claim:
“The claim is based upon the fact that, but for the defendant’s negligent advice, the [mother] would 
have had her pregnancy terminated. The defendant is therefore responsible and caused the child, with 
her disabilities, to be born.”94
The harm is a direct result of a failure on the part of the medical expert.
The purpose of the award of damages in our law was summarised by the 
Constitutional Court in Van Der Merwe v Road Accident Fund and Another 
(Women’s Legal Centre Trust as Amicus Curiae).95 At paragraph 37 of the 
decision the court stated the following:
 So too, the new york Court of Appeals in Becker v Schwartz 386 nE 2d 807 (ny 1978) found this issue 
to raise questions which the law could not answer:
   “Whether it is better to have been born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is 
a mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers and the theologians  The law can assert no 
competence to resolve the issue, particularly in view of the very nearly uniform high value which the 
law and mankind has placed on human life, rather than its absence  not only is there to be found no 
predicate at common law or in statutory enactment for judicial recognition of the birth of a defective 
child as an injury to the child; the implication of such proposition are staggering  Would claims be 
honoured, assuming the breach of an identifiable duty, for less than a perfect birth? And by what 
standards or by whom would perfection be defined? Simply put, a cause of action brought on behalf 
of an infant seeking recovery for wrongful life demands a calculation of damages dependent upon a 
comparison between the [child’s] choice of life in an impaired state and non-existence  This comparison 
the law is not equipped to make ” (812)
90 Cf for example the decision by the Dutch Hoge Raad in the Molenaar decision, as discussed above in 3 2 
2
91 Van Der Walt & Midgeley Principles of Delict 43
92 neethling et al Deliktereg 204
93 Para 30  
94 Friedman v Glicksman 1996 1 SA 1134 (W) 1139
95 2006 4 SA 230 (CC)
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“The notion of damages is best understood not by its nature but by its purpose. Damages are ‘a 
monetary equivalent’ of loss ‘awarded to a person with the object of eliminating as fully as possible 
[her or] his past as well as future damage’. The primary purpose of awarding damages is to place, to 
the fullest possible extent, the injured party in the same position she or he would have been in, but 
for the wrongful conduct. Damages also represent ‘the process through which an impaired interest 
may be restored through money’. To realise this purpose our law recognises patrimonial and non-
patrimonial damages. Both seek to redress the diminution in the quality and usefulness of a legally 
protected interest.” (Footnotes omitted.)
With regard to special damages, the court confirmed that its aim is to 
redress,
“to the extent that money can, the actual or probable reduction of a person’s patrimony as a result of 
the delict or breach of contract. In this sense patrimonial damages are said to be a ‘true equivalent’ of 
the loss. Ordinarily they are calculable in money.”96
In a wrongful birth action the claim for special damages is normally sought 
to redress the patrimonial loss caused by the medical expenses, the costs of 
special schooling and the maintenance of a child born with disabilities. In 
such a claim, “a comparison is made between the value and burden to the 
parents of having a child ... with the value and absence of a burden to the 
parents of not having a child.”97 Put differently, in a wrongful birth claim a 
comparison is made between life with disabilities and non-existence and an 
amount of damages is calculated. It consequently seems rather peculiar that 
the courts allow the parents to claim these damages in a wrongful birth action 
but will deny the child from doing the same.98 It is submitted that there can 
be no obstacle in the assessment of special damages in a wrongful life claim 
since the courts do not have any difficulty in calculating it when the parents 
claim such damages. Furthermore, should the parents of the child for some 
reason, such as the prescription of their claim, or in the event of their death,99 
or even where the parents abandoned their child, be unable to claim for such 
costs, it is unjustifiable to deny the child to claim such damages. So too, the 
Californian Court in Turpin v Sortini found this situation untenable:
“Although the parent and child cannot, of course, both recover for the same medical expenses, we 
believe it would be illogical and anomalous to permit only parents, and not the child, to recover for 
the cost of the child’s own medical care. If such a distinction were established, the afflicted child’s 
receipt of necessary medical expenses might well depend on the wholly fortuitous circumstances of 
whether the parents are available to sue and recover such damages or whether the medical expenses 
are incurred at a time when the parents remain legally responsible for providing such care.”100
It is therefore our submission that an action must exist which will provide 
“a means of financially supporting a child with severe disabilities through 
his or her life.”101 As Kirby J in Harriton v Stephens indeed pointed out, “a 
plaintiff in a wrongful life action would not have any economic needs had the 
96 Para 38 (footnotes omitted)
97 As per Louw J in Stewart v Botha 2007 6 SA 247 (C) para 20
98 See also Priaulx 2002 EJHL 343:
   “Commonly, actions for wrongful life have been accompanied by claims for wrongful birth, the main 
distinction between the two actions being the identity of the plaintiff.” (Our emphasis)  
99 See also Van Den Heever “Prenatal Medical negligence in South African Medical Law: Wrongful Life 
(the Right not to be Born) and the non-existence Paradox” 2006 THRHR 188 192
100 643 P 2d 954 (Cal 1982) 965
101 Priaulx 2002 EJHL 343
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defendant exercised reasonable care, a loss in this regard is directly caused by 
the defendant’s negligent acts and omissions.” 102
General damages, in its turn, was described by Moseneke DCJ in Van Der 
Merwe v Road Accident Fund as being
“utilised to redress the deterioration of a highly personal legal interest that attaches to the body and 
personality of the claimant. However, ordinarily the breach of a personal legal interest does not 
reduce the individual’s estate and does not have a readily determinable or direct monetary value. 
Therefore, general damages are, so to speak, illiquid and are not instantly sounding in money. They 
are not susceptible to exact or immediate calculation in monetary terms. In other words, there is no 
real relationship between the money and the loss. In bodily injury claims, well-established variants 
of general damages include ‘pain and suffering’, ‘disfigurement’, and ‘loss of amenities of life’. 
Besides bodily integrity, our law recognises and protects other personality interests such as dignity, 
mental integrity, bodily freedom, reputation, privacy, feeling, and identity. A wrongful reduction of 
the quality of these personality interests or rights entitles the victim to non-patrimonial damages. 
yet, it is important to recognise that a claim for non-patrimonial damages ultimately assumes the 
form of a monetary award. Guided by the facts of each case and what is just and equitable, courts 
regularly assess and award to claimants general damages sounding in money. In this sense, an award 
of general damages to redress a breach of a personality right also accrues to the successful claimant’s 
patrimony. After all, the primary object of general damages too, in the non-patrimonial sense, is to 
make good the loss; to amend the injury. Its aim too is to place the plaintiff in the same position she 
or he would have been but for the wrongdoing.” 103
In a wrongful life claim, compensation is sought to remedy, inter alia, the 
infringement upon the child’s right to dignity and bodily integrity. The reality 
is that such a child is enduring pain and suffering and for this injury the courts 
must make a monetary award to amend the injury, based upon principles of 
what is just and equitable. The mere difficulty which a court may face in 
the calculation of damages, avoids the issue of the appropriateness of the 
action.104 Dean Stretton105 convincingly maintains that there are numerous 
examples in everyday life in which we experience non-existence of certain 
things. Although we may never experience our own non-existence, there are 
instances in which we would prefer our own non-existence over a continued 
life of torture.106 Just because we do not understand non-existence or will not 
be able to experience it, does not mean that comparisons with non-existence 
are impossible. Courts are also constantly asked to compare something which 
the presiding officer herself has never experienced, but this does not prevent 
them from making such a comparison. So, for example, a court, asked to award 
compensatory damages for the cause of a broken leg, will have to compare a 
hypothetical unbroken leg with a broken leg, despite the fact that the judge 
may have never experienced a broken leg herself. Similarly, Stretton argues, 
a judge cannot avoid a comparison between a plaintiff’s negligently caused 
disabled existence and hypothetical non-existence, and awarding damages 
102 226 CLR 52 para 87  
103 2006 4 SA 230 (CC) paras 39–41 (our emphasis, footnotes omitted)  See n 104
104 Lind “Wrongful-birth and Wrongful-life Actions” 1992 SALJ 428 437
105 “Harriton v Stephens, Waller v James: Wrongful Life and the Logic of non-existence (Australia)” 2006 
Melbourne University Law Review 972
106 He furthermore states at 989 that even though most of us would prefer our existence to never being born, 
“[g]iven a choice between being killed painlessly now, and being tortured to death over the next several 
hours, one would rationally choose the former: although in the torture case one lives for longer, the extra 
hours of existence are so bad, so excruciating, that the value of those extra hours is less than zero, worse 
than simply ceasing to exist ” 
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based on that comparison, merely due to the fact she has never experienced 
her own non-existence.
Brownlie107 in turn argues that our courts need to take a leap from the 
restraint which the “impossible comparison” element places on this action and 
supports the more pragmatic approach by the American court in Curlender v 
Bio-Science Laboratories.108 He reasons as follows:
“Ignoring the preceding cases’ preoccupation with attempting (and failing) to compare life with non-
existence and sidestepping the conceptually confusing philosophical problems associated therewith, 
the court in effect artificially constructed a measure of damages (in the vein of the Pearson report) 
by construing the wrongful life cause of action ‘as the right … to recover damages for the pain 
and suffering to be endured during the limited life span available to such a child, and any special 
pecuniary loss resulting from the ‘impaired condition’.”
Therefore, what should be emphasised in this instance is a comparison 
between non-existence and a life with disabilities and not a comparison between 
life and non-existence. Denial of the claim of wrongful life is a dismissal 
of the reality of a life with disabilities. Pearson very aptly states that “[a]n 
actionable wrong cannot simply be dismissed for philosophical reasons.”109 
The fact is that courts, and in particular the South African Supreme Court of 
Appeal, appear to be incapable of appreciating the uniqueness of this claim. 
The plaintiff child in a wrongful life case has to endure a life with physical 
defects, a deformed existence which in many cases causes excruciating pain 
which she would not have had to suffer had it not been for the negligent 
omission of the defendant medical practitioner.110 Even if a child may not be 
107 “Wrongful Life: Is it a Viable Cause of Action in South Africa?” 1995 Responsa Meridiana 18 33
108 106 Cal App 3d 811, App 165 Cal Rptr 477 (2d Dist 1980)
109 “Liability for So-called Wrongful Pregnancy, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life” 1997 SALJ 91 106
110 It may perhaps at this point be necessary to remind the reader of the disabilities which the plaintiffs in 
the cases discussed above have had to live with and to provide another example of a disabled life which 
may be regarded not to be preferable to non-existence  Van Den Heever 2006 THRHR 198 n 38 notes 
that a child suffering from Lesch-nyan Syndrome, a recessive disorder that can be detected prenataly 
through amniocentesis, is not able to walk or sit unsupported, cannot be toilet trained, has such difficulty 
in swallowing that it is very difficult to feed her, frequently and dramatically vomits and finds it very 
difficult to communicate  The most horrific aspect of this syndrome, however, is that such a child will 
aggressively mutilate herself by biting her fingers and lips destructively  These children scream in pain 
while they bite themselves and may only stop once they have been physically restrained  See also Teff 
“The Action for Wrongful Life” 1985 Int and Comp LQ 440–441 (as quoted by Van Den Heever 2006 
THRHR 196 n 31):
   “As long as abortion or preventing conception remain [sic] the only effective ‘treatment’ for almost 
all genetic defects, it will be open to the courts to withhold a remedy on the basis of the presumed 
undesirability or impossibility of comparing life with non-existence  And several judgments convey 
the impression that fear of implicitly condoning abortion continues to be an underlying rationale of 
non-liability  But should medical technology eventually make possible in utero treatment of hereditary 
disorders, by means of genetic manipulation, a new situation would arise  negligent failure to diagnose 
or treat a genetic defect, which precluded the birth of a healthy child, would then become just another 
instance of legally compensatable pre-natal injury  Pending any such developments, it is submitted 
that judges should resist the understandable temptation to view the whole controversy as a ‘mystery 
more properly to be left to the philosophers and the theologians’  Permitting a remedy does not imply 
a cynical disregard for the preciousness of human existence  It is precisely the recognition of the value 
of life and the laudable reluctance to stigmatise it when impaired that should enable ‘wrongful life’ 
litigation to be kept within socially acceptable limits  The injuries would rarely be deemed to outweigh 
the benefits  Biomedical advance has already added new layers of complexity to the principle of respect 
for human life  The process is bound to continue  It should not be beyond the capacity of the law 
to come to terms with such developments, while still allaying understandable fears of an Orwellian 
nightmare ”
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suffering the severest of disabilities, the reality of a life with disabilities is 
one which courts continue to deny by denying such a child the chance of 
improving her circumstances by means of compensation.
4 3  Wrongfulness
4 3 1  Breach of a legal duty
The traditional approach for the determination of wrongfulness in the case 
of an omission lies in the establishment of a breach of a legal duty which the 
defendant owed the plaintiff. The existence of such a legal duty depends on the 
boni mores or the legal convictions of society.111 The mere fact that the claims 
based on wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth are now acknowledged 
is proof of the reality that our courts are constantly required to extend the 
meaning of the term of wrongfulness and now recognise the existence of a 
legal duty where it had previously not been acknowledged. Therefore, in the 
case of the action for damages based on wrongful birth, it is now accepted 
that the medical practitioner owed a legal duty towards the parents of a child 
born with disabilities and due to the fact that he had not given the proper 
advice, and in this way breached such duty, he should be held liable for the 
damages arising from this birth. In the same way, while bearing in mind the 
development and innovation of medical technology,112 it is submitted that the 
time has arrived for the acknowledgement of a legal duty in wrongful life 
claims.
The recognition of a legal duty has been described by the Appellate Division 
(as it then was) in Knop v Johannesburg City Council as
“the outcome of a value judgment, that the plaintiff’s invaded interest is deemed worthy of legal 
protection against negligent interference by conduct of the kind alleged against the defendant. In the 
decision whether or not there is a duty, many factors interplay; the hand of history, our ideas of morals 
and justice, the convenience of administering the rule and our social ideas as to where the loss should 
fall. Hence, the incidence and extent of duties are liable to adjustment in the light of the constant shifts 
and changes in community attitudes.” 113
So too, the House of Lords in Anns and others v London Borough of 
Merton114 found the enquiry into the existence of a duty of care to consist 
of two stages. It must first be established whether or not there is a “sufficient 
relationship of proximity or neighbourhood” between the alleged wrongdoer 
and the person who has suffered the damage so that the careless behaviour 
of the former may be likely to cause damage to the latter. Should this be the 
case, a duty of care arises and the next stage would be to ask whether or 
not there are any considerations “which ought to negative, or to reduce or 
limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the 
damages to which a breach of it may give rise.” Although there has been 
111 See in general neethling et al Deliktereg 54-55 and the authority cited in n 118
112 Thus, for example, it is now possible for medical practitioners to perform surgery on a foetus while in 
utero.
113 1995 2 SA 1 (A) 27G-I citing Flemming The Law of Torts 4 ed 136
114 [1977] 2 All ER 492 HL at 498g-h as quoted in Minister of Safety & Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 
SA 431 (SCA) (2002 3 All SA 741) para 14
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much criticism of the above methodology by the Australian courts,115 other 
common law jurisdictions such as Canada and new Zealand have endorsed 
this approach.116 The South African Supreme Court of Appeal emphasised in 
this regard that the
“question to be determined is one of legal policy, which must perforce be answered against the 
background of the norms and values of the particular society in which the principle is sought to be 
applied. … What is ultimately required is an assessment, in accordance with the prevailing norms of 
this country, of the circumstances in which it should be unlawful to culpably cause loss. In applying 
the test that was formulated in Minister van Polisie v Ewels [1975 (3) SA 590 (A)] the ‘convictions 
of the community’ must necessarily now be informed by the norms and values of our society as they 
have been embodied in the 1996 Constitution.”117
From the above it is without a doubt clear that the South African courts are 
compelled to consider the community norms and values in a constitutional 
context and must continuously ask itself whether the society would regard it to 
be unacceptable to deny the existence of a legal duty. Therefore, for example, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal has, in the matter of Road Accident Fund v 
Mtati118 rejected the argument that the insured driver of a motor vehicle did 
not have a legal duty towards an unborn victim in a car accident, relying on 
the High Court of Ontario decision in Duval v Seguin119 in a passage cited 
with approval by Dillon LJ in Burton v Islington Health Authority; De Martell 
v Merton and Sutton Health Authority as follows:
“Ann’s mother [Ann was the child en ventre sa mere at the time of the collision] was plainly one of a 
class within the area of foreseeable risk and one to whom the defendants therefore owed a duty. Was 
Ann any the less so? I think not. Procreation is normal and necessary for the preservation of the race. 
If a driver drives on a highway without due care for other users it is foreseeable that some of the other 
users of the highway will be pregnant women and that a child en ventre sa mere may be injured. Such 
a child therefore falls well within the area of potential danger which the driver is required to foresee 
and take reasonable care to avoid.”120
It consequently must be said that it appears to be somewhat illogical 
to impose a duty upon an ordinary driver of a car expecting him to have 
foreseen possible damage to an unborn passenger but to deny the existence of 
a duty of a medical expert towards the unborn to properly advise her parents. 
Consequently, in a doctor-patient relationship, patients must be able to rely on 
the correctness of the advice which they receive from their medical practitioner 
due to the specialist knowledge and expertise which this person purportedly 
has. Should the doctor give the incorrect advice and a child subsequently is 
born suffering from various disabilities, the specialist has breached his duty 
towards one of his patients, the unborn. This was also the view held by the 
Cape High Court in Stewart v Botha121 where, at para 22 of the decision, Louw 
J found that
115 See Caparo Industries PLC v Dickman and Others [1990] 1 All ER 568 (HL) ([1990] 2 AC 605) as quoted 
by the SCA in Minister of Safety & Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) (2002 3 All SA 741) 
para 14
116 See Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) para 15
117 Paras 16–17
118 2005 6 SA 215 (SCA) paras 36, 37
119 (1972) 26 DLR (3d) 418
120 [1992] 3 All ER 833 (CA) 842c–d
121 2007 6 SA 247 (C).
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“[t]he unlawfulness of the defendants’ negligent omissions vis-à-vis Brian is that it precluded the 
mother from making an informed decision on whether or not to abort the foetus. That is the duty owed 
to Brian … The defendant owed the child a duty to properly advise the mother.”
4 3 2  Policy considerations
4 3 2 1  The sanctity of life
Various arguments in the name of public policy have also been used 
to deny the existence of a legal duty. One such an argument was used in 
Friedman v Glicksman122 where Goldblatt J found that “it would be contrary 
to public policy for courts to have to hold that it would be better for a party 
not to have the unquantifiable blessing of life rather than to have such life 
albeit in a marred way.”123 This argument of the sanctity of life, it can be 
safely said, can no longer be used to deny the recognition of the claim and 
Louw J in Stewart indeed stated that the argument has “been eroded in 
South Africa in a number of respects.”124 This is so because the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act permits an abortion “up to and including the 
20th week of the gestation period if … there exists a substantial risk that 
the foetus would suffer from a severe physical or mental abnormality”.125 
An abortion “up to and including the 20th week of the gestation period” is 
even permitted in circumstances where “the continued pregnancy would 
significantly affect the social or economic circumstances of the woman.”126 
This Act, like so many of its counterparts in other jurisdictions in the world, 
therefore recognises the reality that certain classes of persons do not have 
to live. It is furthermore completely unjustifiable to disregard the sanctity of 
life argument when the parents claim for damages in a wrongful birth action 
but when the child is the plaintiff, the person who actually has to endure a 
life with disabilities, “the sanctity of life argument is an insurmountable 
obstacle to the claim.”127
4 3 2 2  Undermining the dignity and value of disabled persons
A further argument which is based on issues of public policy is that, by 
allowing this claim, our courts will implicitly devalue the lives of disabled 
children. It is argued here, that by awarding damages, it would rather give 
recognition to the difficulties which such persons have to face on a daily 
122 1996 1 SA 1134 (W).
123 1142H–I
124 Stewart v Botha 2007 6 SA 247 (C) para 18
125 Section 2(1)(b)(ii)
126 Section 2(1)(b)(iv)
127 Stewart v Botha 2007 6 SA 247 (C) para 20  See also Mukheibir 2008 Obiter 521-522
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basis.128 Where a special wheelchair entrance is built in any public building, 
society is not saying that the lives of disabled persons have less value and that 
such persons must consequently use a different entrance to those that able 
persons use, but rather that the inequality must be recognised and understood. 
It is for this reason that we should endeavour to make disabled persons’ lives 
easier and to promote their right to dignity. Similarly the child in the wrongful 
life action must be compensated because she lives with a disability, one which 
she would not have experienced, had it not been for the negligent behaviour 
of a medical practitioner who her parents had trusted. For this reason, it can 
be argued that the recognition of the claim is rather a confirmation of the 
dignity of such a child. By denying her claim society is in fact renouncing her 
right to dignity instead of protecting and promoting it. The argument that the 
child will be psychologically injured if she is subsequently informed of the 
litigation on her behalf also seems rather unconvincing. It is suggested that 
she may rather suffer feelings of rejection from “being deprived in fact of 
security and affection in [her] early years, a prospect as, if not more, likely in 
the absence of compensation.”129
4 3 2 3  The boni mores of a constitutional democracy
We are furthermore of the opinion that the constitutional dispensation, 
as well as the commencement of certain provisions of the Children’s Act130 
provide a new dimension to the claim for wrongful life. The recognition of 
human rights, coupled with the principle of the best interest of the child,131 
demand sensitivity for the particular vulnerability of the child born with 
disabilities and compel the courts to evaluate this claim for wrongful life and 
the delictual elements required from this perspective. Three considerations 
are of key importance in this regard.
The Constitution firstly provides the foundation for a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental rights, acknowledging the 
child within this context to be the bearer of human rights. The fact is that the 
child, who is the plaintiff in the action for wrongful life, is a person with a right 
to human dignity,132 the right to bodily and psychological integrity,133 and the 
right to life.134 Being a child in itself demands that the right to life must be 
128 Once again we find ourselves in agreement with Kirby J where in Harriton v Stephens 226 CLR 52 he 
states that:
   “the epithet ‘wrongful life’ is seriously misleading  It misdescribes the essential nature of the complaint  
The plaintiff in a wrongful life action does not maintain that his or her existence, as such, is wrongful  
nor does the plaintiff contend that his or her life should now be terminated  Rather, the ‘wrong’ alleged 
is the negligence of the defendant that has directly resulted in present suffering  Professor Peter Cane 
identified this distinction, stating ‘[t]he plaintiff in [wrongful life] cases is surely not complaining that 
he was born, simpliciter, but that because of the circumstances under which he was born his lot in life 
is a disadvantaged one ’” (para 10)
129 Berman v Allen 80 nJ 421 (1979) as quoted by Van Den Heever 2006 THRHR 199
130 See n 5
131 Enshrined in s 28(2) of the Constitution and s 9 of the Children’s Act
132 As enshrined by s 10 of the Constitution  See also s 6(2)(b), s 11(1)(c) and s 11(2)(b) of the Children’s 
Act
133 As enshrined by s 12(2) of the Constitution
134 As enshrined by s 11 of the Constitution
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interpreted on a multi-dimensional level in order to also include the right to 
survival and development.135 The claim based on wrongful life can therefore 
not be assessed without consideration of these constitutional imperatives.
A second aspect, which is closely related to the concept of fundamental 
rights, is that of the provisions of the Children’s Act. Section 6 of the Act, for 
example, contains a number of general principles which guide all proceedings, 
actions and decisions by any organ of state in any matter concerning a child 
or children in general. One of these guidelines consists of a peremptory 
provision that all proceedings, actions or decisions in a matter concerning a 
child must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the child’s rights set out in the 
Bill of Rights of the Constitution, the best interests of the child standard set 
out in section 7 of the Act and the other rights and principles contained in this 
Act.136 The specific reference to and the inclusion of the rights contained in the 
Constitution must be emphasized as it reinforces the human rights perspective 
of the Act. This reference, coupled with the further requirements of respect for 
the child’s inherent dignity137 and fair and equitable treatment of the child,138 
not only represent the normative values of the CRC and the Constitution but 
also the realisation thereof.
Section 6(2)( f ) of the Children’s Act furthermore requires the court to 
“recognise a child’s disability and create an enabling environment to respond 
to the special needs that the child has.” This is further defined by section 
11(1) of the Act which demands due consideration of the provision to the 
child with disabilities of parental care, family care or special care as and 
when appropriate. In any matter concerning the child with disabilities due 
consideration must be given to making it possible for the child to participate 
in social, cultural, religious and educational activities, recognising the special 
needs that the child may have139 and providing the child with conditions that 
ensure dignity, promote self-reliance and facilitate active participation in the 
community.140 The fact that recognition is given to the disabilities of the child 
and the special needs of such a child is therefore an advancement of the human 
dignity of such a child.
The third consideration is that of the best interests of the child, which has 
been enshrined as a fundamental right of the child.141 It is submitted that it 
is imperative that this particular right be considered when the question as to 
wrongfulness is considered in the wrongful life claim. This right is not only a 
135 See for example also Article 6 of the United nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“the CRC”) 
which in Article 6 2 stipulates that “State Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the 
survival and development of the child ” S 6(2)(e) and ( f ) of the Children’s Act in turn provides that in all 
proceedings, actions or decisions recognition of a child’s need for development and to engage in play and 
other recreational activities appropriate to the child’s age as well as recognition of a child’s disability must 
take place and that an enabling environment to respond to the special needs that the child has, must be 
created
136 S 6(2)(a) of the Children’s Act  
137 S 6(2)(b)
138 S 6(2)(c)
139 S 11(1)(b)
140 Section 11(1)(c)  See also s 11(2) which provides for similar considerations with respect to the child 
suffering from chronic illness
141 S 6(2)(c)
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legal requirement but also represents a policy consideration in a constitutional 
dispensation. In fact, certain factors which must be considered in determining 
the best interests of the child, afford specific recognition to the child with 
disabilities. Section 7(1)(i) of the Children’s Act stipulates that, whenever a 
provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be 
applied, any disability a child may have must be taken into consideration. In 
terms of section 7(1)(h) the child’s physical and emotional security and his or 
her intellectual, emotional, social and cultural development, must furthermore 
be taken into account.142 In a wrongful life claim, when considering whether 
or not to award monetary compensation to a disabled child, born due to the 
negligence of a medical expert, it is crucial that the court heed the above 
considerations.
5  Conclusion
It is clear from the discussion above that, in essence, the claim for wrongful 
life is being denied in our courts based on only one consideration, that being 
the courts’ inability to calculate damages. We are of the opinion, however, 
that we have shown why this aspect should not be such an “insurmountable 
obstacle”143 to the recognition of the claim. Turning our attention back to the 
decision of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal in Stewart v Botha144 
it is submitted that the court, by dismissing the claim purely because it could 
not make a choice between life with disabilities and non-existence, without 
embarking on a true deliberation of the underlying principles of this claim, the 
constitutional imperatives, or the best interests of the disabled child, has failed 
in its duty towards this child and its duty to develop or enhance the law. This 
failure occurred despite the fact that the relevant provisions of the Children’s 
Act had in fact, at the time of the judgment, already been in operation for 
almost a year. We argue that these provisions, and in particular the standard of 
the best interest of the child, provide sufficient grounds to develop and enhance 
the law regarding this unique claim. We are consequently of the opinion that 
when considering the delictual elements in the claim for wrongful life, the 
above-mentioned provisions must provide the point of departure or, at the very 
least, deserve some consideration. Snyders AJA reasoned that it should not be 
asked of the law to answer the question as to whether or not a “particular child 
should have been born at all” as this “goes so deeply to the heart of what it is 
to be human.”145 We, however, with the greatest respect, disagree, since we 
regard it to be the duty of the courts to answer the most difficult questions. In 
some cases this exercise inevitably requires an appreciation of what it means 
to be human.146
142 See also s 7(1)( j) which provides that any chronic illness from which a child may suffer must also be 
considered
143 Cf para 20 of Stewart v Botha 2007 6 SA 247 (C)
144 Stewart v Botha 2008 6 SA 310 (SCA)
145 Para 28
146 One cannot help but agree with Stretton “Harriton v Stephens, Waller v James: Wrongful Life and the 
Logic of non-existence (Australia)” (2006) Melbourne University Law Review 972 1001 that maybe, in 
this particular case, the decision “would have been better off not existing ”
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SUMMARY
In Friedman v Glicksman 1996 1 SA 1134 (W) the claim for wrongful life was denied. Eleven years 
later the Cape High Court again denied the existence of the claim in Stewart v Botha 2007 6 SA 247 
(C); 2007 9 BCLR 1012; 2007 3 All SA 440 albeit for different reasons than those used by the Court 
in Friedman. The Supreme Court of Appeal had the opportunity to provide well-reasoned answers to 
the many questions resulting from the two conflicting decisions and to finally put to rest the matter of 
whether the action should be recognised in South African law or not. Unfortunately it failed to do so. 
This article discusses the recent South African and international case law which considered the action, 
placing emphasis on the policy issues underlying the claim. In light of the constitutional dispensation 
and the promulgation of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, it is argued that the opportunity now exists to 
reconcile the principles of delict with the constitutionally enshrined rights of the child to ensure that 
the best interests of the child are served.
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